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Abstract
Differential privacy (DP) has arisen as the state-of-the-
art metric for quantifying individual privacy when sensitive
data are analyzed, and it is starting to see practical deploy-
ment in organizations such as the US Census Bureau, Apple,
Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. There are two popular
models for deploying differential privacy – standard differ-
ential privacy (SDP), where a trusted server aggregates all
the data and runs the DP mechanisms, and local differen-
tial privacy (LDP), where each user perturbs their own data
and perturbed data is analyzed. Due to security concerns
arising from aggregating raw data at a single server, sev-
eral real world deployments in industry have embraced the
LDP model [17, 1, 2, 3]. However, systems based on the
LDP model tend to have poor utility – “a gap” in the utility
achieved as compared to systems based on the SDP model.
In this work, we survey and synthesize emerging direc-
tions of research at the intersection of differential privacy
and cryptography. First, we survey solutions that combine
cryptographic primitives like secure computation, anony-
mous communication and oblivious computation with dif-
ferential privacy to give alternatives to the LDP model that
avoid a trusted server as in SDP but close the gap in accu-
racy. These cryptographic primitives introduce performance
bottlenecks and necessitate efficient alternatives. Second, we
synthesize work in an area that we call “DP-Cryptography”
– cryptographic primitives that are allowed to leak differ-
entially private outputs. These primitives have orders of
magnitude better performance than standard cryptographic
primitives. DP-cryptography primitives are perfectly suited
for implementing alternatives to LDP, but are also applica-
ble to scenarios where standard cryptographic primitives do
not have practical implementations. Through this unique
lens of research taxonomy, we survey the landscape of on-
going research in these directions while also providing novel
directions for future research.
1. INTRODUCTION
On Feb 15, 2019, John Abowd, chief scientist at the US
Census Bureau, announced the results of a reconstruction at-
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tack that they proactively launched using data released un-
der the 2010 Decennial Census [18]. The decennial census
released billions of statistics about people like “how many
people of the age 10-20 live in New York City” or “how
many people live in 4 person households”. Using only the
data publicly released in 2010, an internal team was able
to (a) correctly reconstruct records of address (by census
block), age, gender, race and ethnicity for 142 million peo-
ple (about 46% of the US population), and (b) correctly
match these data to commercial datasets circa 2010 to asso-
ciate personal-identifying information such as names for 52
million persons (17% of the population). This is not specific
to the US Census Bureau – such attacks can occur in any
setting where statistical information in the form of deiden-
tified data, statistics or even machine learning models are
released. That such attacks are possible was predicted over
15 years ago by a seminal paper by Irit Dinur and Kobbi
Nissim [12] – releasing a sufficiently large number of aggre-
gate statistics with sufficiently high accuracy provides suf-
ficient information to reconstruct the underlying database
with high accuracy. The practicality of such a large scale
reconstruction by the US Census Bureau underscores the
grand challenge that public organizations, industry, and sci-
entific research faces: how can we safely disseminate results
of data analysis on sensitive databases?
An emerging answer is differential privacy. An algorithm
satisfies differential privacy (DP) if its output is insensi-
tive to adding, removing or changing one record in its in-
put database. Differential privacy is considered the “gold
standard” for privacy for a number of reasons. It provides a
persuasive mathematical proof of privacy to individuals with
several rigorous interpretations [24, 23]. The differential pri-
vacy guarantee is composable and repeating invocations of
differential private algorithms lead to a graceful degradation
of privacy. The US Census Bureau was the first big orga-
nization to adopt differential privacy in 2008 for a product
called OnTheMap [27], and subsequently there have been
deployments by Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, and
Uber [17, 1, 11, 2, 3].
Differential privacy is typically implemented by collecting
data from individuals in the clear at a trusted data collector,
then applying one or more differentially private algorithms,
and finally releasing the outputs. This approach, which we
call standard differential privacy (SDP), works in cases like
the US Census Bureau where there is a natural trusted data
curator. However, when Google wanted to monitor and ana-
lyze the Chrome browser properties of its user base to detect
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security vulnerabilities, they chose a different model called
local differential privacy (LDP). In LDP, individuals perturb
their records before sending it to the server, obviating the
need for a trusted data curator. Since the server only sees
perturbed records, there is no centralized database of sensi-
tive information that is susceptible to an attack or subpoena
requests from governments. The data that Google was col-
lecting – browser fingerprints – uniquely identify individuals.
By using LDP, Google was not liable to storing these highly
identifying user properties. Due to these attractive security
properties a number of real world applications of differen-
tial privacy in the industry – Google’s RAPPOR [17], Apple
Diagnostics [1] and Microsoft Telemetry [11] – embrace the
LDP model.
However, the improved security properties of LDP come
at a cost in terms of utility. Differentially private algo-
rithms hide the presence or absence of an individual by
adding noise. Under the SDP model, counts over the sensi-
tive data, e.g., “number of individuals who use the bing.com
search engine”, can be released by adding a constant amount
of noise. In the LDP model, noise is added to each indi-
vidual record. Thus, answering the same count query re-
quires adding O(√N) error (Theorem 2.1 from [10]) for the
same level of privacy, where N is the number of individu-
als participating in the statistic. In other words, under the
LDP model, for a database of a billion people, one can only
learn properties that are common to at least 30000 people
(O(√N)). In contrast, under SDP, one can learn properties
that are shared by as few as a 100 people (O(1) including
constants; cf [15]). Thus, the LDP model operates under
more practical trust assumptions than SDP, but as a result
incurs a significant loss in data utility. In this work, we
review literature in this domain under two categories:● Cryptography for DP: We review a growing line of
research that aims to use cryptographic primitives to
bridge the gap between SDP and LDP. In these solu-
tions, the trusted data curator in SDP is replaced by
cryptographic primitives that result in (a) more prac-
tical trust assumptions than the SDP model, and (b)
better utility than under the LDP model. Cryptographic
primitives such as anonymous communication and secure
computation have shown significant promise in improv-
ing the utility of differentially private implementations
while continuing to operate under the practical trust as-
sumptions that are accepted by the security community.● DP for Cryptography: Differential privacy is typically
applied to settings that involve complex analytics over
large datasets. Introducing cryptographic primitives re-
sults in concerns about the feasibility of practical imple-
mentations at that scale. This has given rise to a second
line of work that employs differential privacy as a tool to
speed up cryptographic primitives, thereby pushing the
frontiers of their practical deployments. While the origi-
nal cryptographic primitives are defined with respect to
perfect privacy, under differential privacy, it is ok to learn
distributional information about the underlying dataset.
We explore in depth the following cryptographic primi-
tives (a) secure computation (b) secure communication,
and show how in the context of differential privacy one
can build “leaky” but efficient implementations of these
primitives.
These lines of work both reflect exciting directions for the
computer science community. We begin by giving a brief
technical introduction to differential privacy in Section 2.
We discuss the“Cryptography for DP”paradigm in Section 3
and “DP for cryptography” in Section 4. Section 5 provides
concrete ideas for future work as well as open problems in
the field through the lens of combining differential privacy
and cryptography.
Key Insights● Local Differential Privacy is increasingly being em-
braced as the primary model of deployment of differential
privacy, albeit at a heavy accuracy cost.● Cryptographic primitives can help bridge the utility gap
between systems deployed in the local differential privacy
model and standard differential privacy model but the in-
creased utility may come at the cost of performance.● DP-cryptographic primitives, that are relaxed notions
of cryptographic primitives that leak differentially pri-
vate outputs, permit implementations that are orders of
magnitude faster than the regular primitives.
2. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy [13] is a state-of-the-art privacy metric
for answering queries from statistical databases while pro-
tecting individual privacy. Since its inception, there has
been considerable research in both the theoretical founda-
tions [12, 14] as well as some real world deployments [17, 1]
of differential privacy. The rigorous mathematical founda-
tion and the useful properties of differential privacy have led
to an emerging consensus about its use among the security
and privacy community.
2.1 Definition of Differential Privacy
Informally, the privacy guarantees of differential privacy
can be understood as follows: Given any two databases,
otherwise identical except one of them contains random data
in place of data corresponding to any single user, differential
privacy requires that the response mechanism will behave
approximately the same on the two databases. Formally,
Definition 1. Let M be a randomized mechanism that
takes a database instance D and has a range O. We say M is(, δ)-differentially private, if for any neighboring databases(D1,D2) that differ in the data of a single user, and for any
S ⊆ O, we have
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ (1)
Differential privacy enjoys some important properties that
make it a useful privacy metric. First, the privacy guar-
antees of differential privacy have been thoroughly studied
using various metrics from statistics and information the-
ory such as hypothesis testing and Bayesian inference [24,
23]. Thus, the semantic meaning of its privacy guarantees
is well understood. Differential privacy also has a number
of composition properties which enable the analysis of pri-
vacy leakage for complex algorithms. In particular, sequen-
tial composition addresses the impossibility result by Dinur
and Nissim [12] and quantifies the degradation of privacy
as the number of sequential accesses to the data increases.
The post-processing theorem (a special case of sequential
composition) ensures that the adversary cannot weaken the
Figure 1: Differentially private mechanisms randomize query
response to achieve privacy. If the true response to a query
such as “What fraction of users use drugs illegally?” was
20%, then a high privacy response mechanism (low  value)
will add a lot of noise yielding low utility. On the contrary,
if a low privacy response mechanism was used (high  value),
the response will be very close to 20% yielding high utility.
privacy guarantees of a mechanism by transforming the re-
ceived response. The end-to-end privacy guarantee of an
algorithm over the entire database can thus be established
using the above composition theorems and more advanced
theorems [15].
2.2 Differentially Private Mechanisms
Next, we review two classic differentially private mech-
anisms, the Laplace mechanism and the Randomized Re-
sponse mechanism, with the following scenario: a data ana-
lyst would like to find out how many users use drugs illegally.
Such a question would not elicit any truthful answers from
users and hence we require a mechanism that guarantees (a)
response privacy for the users and (b) good utility extraction
for the data analyst.
Laplace Mechanism: The Laplace mechanism [13] con-
siders a trusted data curator (SDP model) who owns a table
N of truthful records of users, for example, each record in-
dicates whether a user uses drugs illegally. If a data an-
alyst would like to learn how many users use drugs ille-
gally, the data curator (trusted) computes the true answer
of this query and then perturbs it with a random (Laplace
distributed) noise that is sufficient to provide privacy. The
magnitude of this noise depends on the largest possible change
on the query output – also known as the sensitivity of the
query – if the data corresponding to a single user is changed.
Randomized Response Mechanism: Randomized re-
sponse was first introduced by Warner in 1965 as a research
technique for survey interviews. It enabled respondents to
answer sensitive questions (about topics such as sexuality,
drug consumption) while maintaining the confidentiality of
their responses. An analyst interested in learning aggre-
gate information about sensitive user behavior would like to
query this function on a database that is distributed across
N clients with each client having its own private response
x1,⋯, xN . Instead of releasing xi directly, the clients release
a perturbed version of their response yi, thus maintaining
response privacy. The analyst collects these perturbed re-
sponses and recovers meaningful statistics using reconstruc-
tion techniques.
Both these approaches have gained popularity in many
applications of differential privacy due to their simplicity as
well as the rigorous privacy guarantee on user data. Fig. 1
shows the behavior of differentially private mechanisms for
two different privacy values in reference to the true statistic.
A less private response results in a more accurate query re-
sult while a more private response results in a less accurate
query result.
3. CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
By itself, differential privacy is a guarantee on a mecha-
nism and hence is “independent”of the deployment scenario.
However, when used in practice, practical trust assumptions
are made that enable the deployment of differential privacy
based systems. In this section, we consider two popular de-
ployment scenarios for differential privacy – Standard Dif-
ferential Privacy (SDP, graphically represented in Fig. 2D)
and Local Differential Privacy (LDP, graphically represented
in Fig. 2A). SDP relies on the need for a trusted data ag-
gregator who follows the protocol. However, in practice,
a trusted data aggregator may not always exist. LDP on
the other hand does not require a trusted data aggregator1.
With privacy regulations such as GDPR and FERPA, large
organizations such as Google increasingly embrace the LDP
model thereby avoiding the liability of storing such sensi-
tive user data. This approach also insures data collectors
from potential theft or subpoenas from the government. For
these reasons, LDP is frequently a more attractive deploy-
ment scenario. However, the utility of the statistics released
in LDP is poorer than that in SDP. Consequently, there is
a gap in the trust assumptions and the utility achieved by
mechanisms in SDP and LDP: high trust assumptions, high
utility in SDP and lower trust assumptions, lower utility in
LDP. We ask the following question:
Can cryptographic primitives help in bridging
the gap that exists between mechanisms in the
standard differential privacy model and the local
differential privacy model?
An emerging direction of research has been to explore the
use of cryptography to bridge the trust-accuracy gap and
obtain the best of both worlds: high accuracy without as-
suming trusted data aggregator. In this section, we explore
in depth two concrete examples of the role of cryptography
in bridging this gap (a) anonymous communication (b) se-
cure computation and encryption.
Key Challenges: There exists a big gap in the accu-
racy and trust achieved by known mechanisms in the stan-
dard differential privacy setting with a trusted data cura-
tor (Fig. 2D) and local differential privacy without such a
trusted curator (Fig. 2A). Achieving the utility as in the
SDP setting while operating under practical trust assump-
tions such as those in LDP has proven to be a tough chal-
lenge. Cryptographic primitives show promise in solving this
challenge.
1Differentially private federated learning is simply a special
case of the LDP deployment scenario.
Figure 2: This figure shows various deployment scenarios of differential privacy and the underlying trust assumptions in each
of them. Standard Differential Privacy (SDP, Fig. 2D) assumes a trusted database, and is thus able to achieve high accuracy
i.e., O(1) error. Local Differential Privacy (LDP, Fig. 2A) on the other hand, does not rely on the use of a trusted database
but achieves lower accuracy i.e., O(√N) error. The goal is to achieve utility of the SDP setting while operating under more
practical assumptions such as the LDP setting (i.e., no trusted database). Fig 2B and Fig 2C show how different cryptographic
primitives can be used to improve the utility of DP deployments under such practical assumptions.
Key Insights of using Cryptography for DP● Increasing privacy regulations such as GDPR and
FERPA have pushed organizations such as Google to em-
brace the LDP model for deployment of differential pri-
vacy applications.● Cryptographic primitives show promise in enabling
practical differentially private applications without a
trusted server, while bridging the utility gap between
LDP and SDP.
3.1 Improve Accuracy via Anonymous Com-
munication
In LDP, each data owner independently perturbs their
own input (e.g., using the randomized response mechanism)
before the aggregation on an untrusted server. This re-
sults in a large noise in the final output, O(√N) for the
case of statistical counting queries [10]. Applications such
as Google’s RAPPOR [17], Apple Diagnostics [1], and Mi-
crosoft Telemetry [11] which use this LDP deployment model
operate under more practical trust assumptions yet suffer
from poor accuracy/utility. Recent works [8, 16, 10] show
that the use of an anonymous communication channel can
help improve the accuracy of statistical counting query for
LDP and thereby eliminate the need for a trusted data cu-
rator. We will use one of these systems called Prochlo [8, 16]
to illustrate the key idea of how anonymity can help improve
the accuracy of such applications.
3.1.1 Case Study: Prochlo
Anonymous communication channels, first proposed by
Chaum in 1981 [9] are systems that enable a user to remain
unidentifiable from a set of other users (called the anonymity
set). A larger anonymity set corresponds to a greater pri-
vacy guarantee. Examples of such systems include Mixnets,
which use proxies to mix communications from various users.
In order to circumvent the limitations of LDP, Google ex-
plored the use of an anonymous communication channel to
improve the accuracy of queries under differential privacy.
The proposed technique is called Prochlo [8, 16]. This tech-
nique consists of three steps as shown in Fig. 2B: Encode,
Shuffle, and Analyze (ESA). The first encoding step is sim-
ilar to LDP where data owners randomize their input data
independently. The second step uses an anonymous commu-
nication channel to collect encoded data into batches during
a lengthy time interval and shuffles this data to remove the
linkability between the output of the communication chan-
nel and the data owners. Last, the anonymous, shuffled data
is analyzed by a data analyst.
The shuffling step is the crucial link in achieving anony-
mous communication by breaking linkability between the
user and their data. This step strips user-specific metadata
such as time stamps or source IP addresses, and batches
a large number of reports before forwarding them to data
analysts. Additional thresholding in this step will discard
highly unique reports (e.g. a long API bit-vector) to pre-
vent attackers with sufficient background information from
linking a report with its data owner. Hence, attacks based on
traffic analysis and longitudinal analysis can be prevented,
even if a user contributes to multiple reports. Prochlo imple-
ments this shuffling step using trusted hardware as proxies
to eliminate the need for a trusted third party. Furthermore,
this shuffling step can amplify the privacy guarantee of LDP
and hence improves the accuracy of the analysis, even when
there is a single invocation from a user. We will next show
the intuition for this base case.
3.1.2 Accuracy Improvement
To illustrate how anonymous communication can help im-
prove accuracy, let us look at a simple example of computing
the sum of boolean values from N data owners, f ∶ ∑Ni=1 xi,
where xi ∈ {0,1}. In LDP, each data owner reports a random
bit with probability p or reports the true bit with probability
1 − p to achieve -LDP. When using additional anonymous
communication channels, the data owners can enhance their
privacy by hiding in a larger set ofN values, since the attack-
ers (aggregator and analyst) see only the anonymized set of
reports {x˜1, . . . , x˜N}. The improved privacy guarantee can
be shown equivalent to a simulated algorithm that (a) first
samples a value s from a binomial distribution B(N,p) to
simulate the number of data owners who report a random
bit, and then (b) samples a subset of responses for these
s data owners from {x˜1, . . . , x˜N}. The randomness of these
sampling processes can amplify the privacy parameter based
on a well studied sub-sampling argument [21, 5]. Therefore,
given the value of the privacy parameter, the required noise
parameter can be scaled down and hence the corresponding
error can be reduced to O(√log(N)). For general bounded
real-valued linear statistics, the error is established to be
O(log(N)) [16, 10]. Note that these accuracy improvements
assume that there is no collusion between the analyst and
the anonymous communication, otherwise, the privacy guar-
antee will fall back to the same as LDP.
In reference to Fig. 2, these works demonstrate the im-
provement in going from Fig. 2A to Fig. 2B showing a trade-
off between accuracy and trust assumptions.
3.2 Improve Trust via Encryption & Secure
Computation
SDP requires the use of a trusted data aggregator to achieve
high accuracy. A number of works have explored the use of
encryption and secure computation to eliminate the need for
this trusted data aggregator [4, 31, 6]. The key challenge
here is to maintain the same level of accuracy as in SDP.
We will use one of these proposed systems called DJoin to
demonstrate the use of secure computation to enable high
accuracy computation without the need for a trusted data
aggregator. There is a complementary synergy between se-
cure computation and differential privacy and thus their
combination achieves a strong privacy protection. For in-
stance, secure computation ensures all parties learn only the
output of the computation but nothing else while differen-
tial privacy bounds the information leakage of individuals in
the output of the computation, resulting in a system that is
better than the use of secure computation or DP alone.
3.2.1 Case Study: DJoin
Consider a simple setting where two parties would like to
compute the intersection size of their data while preserving
differential privacy for both datasets. If each party does not
trust each other, how can we ensure a constant additive error
as if they trust each other? It is well known that the lower
bound for this query is
√
N , where N is the data size of
each party [28], if we want to ensure the view of each party
satisfies differential privacy. However, if we assume both
parties are computationally bounded, a constant additive
error can be achieved.
DJoin [31] offers a concrete protocol for achieving DP
under this assumption. This protocol applies private set-
intersection cardinality technique to privately compute the
noisy intersection set of the two datasets. First, party A
defines a polynomial over a finite field whose roots are the
elements owned by A. Party A then sends the homomor-
phic encryptions of the coefficients to party B, along with
its public key. Then the encrypted polynomial is evaluated
at each of Party B’s inputs, followed by a multiplication
with a fresh random number. The number of zeros in the
results is the true intersection size between A and B. To
provide differential privacy, party B adds a number of ze-
ros (differentially-private noise of O(1) independent of data
size) to the results and sends the randomly permuted results
back to party A. Party A decrypts the results and counts the
number of zeros. Party A also adds another copy of differ-
entially private noise to the count and sends the result it
back to party B. In other words, both parties add noise to
their inputs to achieve privacy. However, the final protocol
output has only an error of O(1), which is the same as the
SDP setting.
3.2.2 Trust Improvement
Using secure computation and encryptions achieves a con-
stant additive error like SDP and prevents any party from
seeing the other party’s input in the clear. However, this
requires an additional assumption of all parties being com-
putationally bounded in the protocol. Hence, the type of
differential privacy guarantee achieved in DJoin is known as
computational differential privacy [30]. In addition, most
of the existing protocols consider honest-but-curious adver-
saries who follow the protocol specification or consider ma-
licious adversaries with an additional overhead to enforce
honest behaviour i.e., verify that the computation was per-
formed correctly.
In reference to Fig. 2, these works demonstrate the im-
provement in going from Fig. 2D to Fig. 2C eliminating the
need for a trusted data aggregator.
4. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR CRYP-
TOGRAPHY
We have seen in Section 3 that cryptographic primitives
show promise in bridging the utility gap between SDP and
LDP. However, the large overhead of implementing these
conventional cryptographic primitives forms a bottleneck for
the deployment of such systems. This motivates the need to
enhance the performance of such cryptographic primitives.
We ask the following question:
Can we formulate leaky versions of cryptographic
primitives for enhancing system performance while
rigorously quantifying the privacy loss using dif-
ferential privacy?
DP-cryptographic primitives are significant for two reasons.
First, since the final privacy guarantees of such systems are
differential privacy, it is natural to relax the building blocks
such as cryptographic primitives to provide differentially pri-
vate guarantees. Secondly, the composability properties of
differential privacy allow for rigorous quantification of the
privacy of the end-to-end system. We showcase benefits of
“DP-cryptographic” systems through two detailed case stud-
ies on (a) secure computation and (b) secure communication.
Key Challenges: Cryptographic primitives provide strong
privacy guarantees. However, deployment of certain cryp-
tographic primitives in practical systems is limited due to
the large overhead of these primitives. Relaxing the pri-
vacy guarantees in a manner that is amenable to rigorous
quantification is difficult and differential privacy can be well
utilized to provide a solution to this problem to improve
performance overhead.
Figure 3: (A) Exhaustive padding of intermediate results in an oblivious query evaluation; (B) Effect of Shrinkwrap on
intermediate result sizes when joining tables R and S; (C) Aspirin count with synthetic data scaling. Executed using Circuit
model.  = 0.5, δ= .00005.
Key Insights of using DP for Cryptography● We can obtain practical cryptographic implementations
that are efficient, while bounding the privacy leakage us-
ing differential privacy.● In the context of the end goal of differentially private
systems, it is natural to relax the privacy of cryptographic
primitives to provide differentially private guarantees.
4.1 Improve Performance of Cryptographic Com-
putation Primitives
Cryptographic computation primitives such as Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption (FHE) and secure Multi-Party Com-
putation (MPC) enable private computation over data. Over
the past few years, there has been tremendous progress in
making these primitives practical – most promising of which
has been Multi-Party Computation. MPC allows a group
of data owners to jointly compute a function while keeping
their inputs secret. In this section, we show the perfor-
mance improvement on MPC based private computation, in
particular, differentially private query processing.
4.1.1 Case Study: Shrinkwrap
Shrinkwrap [7] is a system that applies differential pri-
vacy throughout an SQL query execution to improve perfor-
mance. In secure computation, the computation overheads
depend on the largest possible data size so that no additional
information is leaked. For example, two parties would like
to securely compute the answer for the SQL query shown in
Figure 3A. This query asks for the number of patients with
heart disease who have taken a dosage of “aspirin”. Fig-
ure 3A expresses this query as a directed acyclic graph of
database operators. For example, the first filter operator
takes N records from the two parties and outputs an inter-
mediate result which has patients with heart disease (hd).
To hide the selectivity (fraction of records selected) of this
operator, the baseline system needs to pad the intermediate
result to its maximum possible size, which is the same as
the input size. Exhaustive padding will also be applied to
the intermediate output of the two joins and result in an in-
termediate result cardinality of N3 and a high performance
overhead. However, if the selectivity of the filter is 10−3,
cryptographic padding adds a 1000× overhead. Is there a
way to pad fewer dummies to the intermediate result while
ensuring a provable privacy guarantee?
Shrinkwrap helps reduce this overhead by padding each
intermediate output of the query plan to a differentially pri-
vate cardinality rather than to the worst case. As shown
in Figure 3B, without Shrinkwrap, the output of a join op-
erator with two inputs, each of size N is padded to a size
of N2. With Shrinkwrap, the output is first padded to the
worst size and the output is sorted such that all the dummies
are at the end of the storage. This entire process is executed
obliviously. Then Shrinkwrap draws a non-negative integer
value with a general Laplace mechanism [7] and truncates
the storage at the end. This approach reduces the input size
of the subsequent operators and thereby their I/O cost. We
can see from Figure 3C that Shrinkwrap provides a signifi-
cant improvement in performance over the baseline without
DP padding for increasing database sizes.
The relaxed privacy in the secure computation of Shrinkwrap
can be quantified rigorously [7] using computational differ-
ential privacy. Assuming all parties are computationally
bounded and work in the semi-honest setting, it can be
shown that data owners have a computational differentially
private view over the input of other data owners; when noisy
answers are returned to the data analyst, the data analyst
has a computational differentially private view over the in-
put data of all the data owners.
4.2 Improve Performance of Cryptographic Com-
munication Primitives
Anonymous communication systems aim to protect user
identity from the communication recipient and third parties.
Despite considerable research efforts in the domain, practi-
cal anonymous communication over current internet archi-
tecture is proving to be a challenge. Even if the message
contents are encrypted, the packet metadata is difficult to
hide. On one end, systems such as Dissent [35] offer strong
privacy guarantees yet can scale only to a limited number of
participants. On the other end, practical deployed systems
such as Tor are vulnerable to traffic analysis and other at-
tacks, limiting their use due to the non-rigorous nature of
their privacy guarantees. We will show a case study that
uses differential privacy to reduce the communication cost
while offering rigorous privacy guarantee. We denote this
primitive differentially private anonymous communication.
4.2.1 Case Study: Vuvuzela
Vuvuzela [34] is an anonymous communication system
that uses differential privacy to enable a highly scalable sys-
tem with relaxed yet rigorously quantified privacy guaran-
Figure 4: Vuvuzela is a secure messaging system. An adversary who can observe and tamper with all network traffic cannot
distinguish whether Alice is messaging Bob, Charlie, or is simply not communicating. Vuvuzela uses differential privacy to
add noise and mask the privacy invasive metadata, thereby provably hiding information about user communication patters.
Vuvuzela achieves a throughput of 68,000 messages per second for a million users scaling linearly with number of users.
tees. Vuvuzela provides indistinguishable traffic patterns
to clients who: (a) are actively communicating with other
clients (b) are not communicating with anyone. In reference
to Fig. 4, an adversary is unable to distinguish the following
three scenarios (a) Alice not communicating (b) Alice com-
municating with Bob (c) Alice communicating with Charlie.
In each of the scenarios, a Vuvuzela client’s network traffic
appears indistinguishable from the other scenarios.
Vuvuzela employs a number of servers S1,⋯Sn where at
least one of the servers is assumed to be honest. Clients
send (and receive) messages to (and from) the first server,
which in turn is connected to the second server and so on.
The client creates a layered encryption of its message m i.e.,
EncS1(⋯EncSn(m)), where EncS(⋅) is the encryption under
the key of server S. The clients leave messages at virtual
locations in a large space of final destinations (called dead
drops), where the other legitimate client can receive it. To
hide if a client is communicating or not, a client not in an
active conversation makes fake requests to appear indistin-
guishable from a client in an active conversation. If two
clients are in active conversation, they exchange messages
via the same random dead drop.
Vuvuzela’s threat model assumes that at least one server
is honest and the adversary is a powerful network level ad-
versary (observing all network traffic) potentially corrupting
all other servers2. The only computation hidden from the
adversary is the local computation performed by the honest
server which unlinks users’ identifiers from the dead drops
and adds cover (dummy) traffic. As a consequence, the ad-
versary can only observe the number of single or double ex-
change requests at the dead drop locations. Each Vuvuzela
server adds cover traffic using a Laplace distribution to ran-
domize the (a) number of single dead drops and (b) number
of double dead drops, which is observable by the adversary.
Such random cover traffic addition along with the assump-
tion of at least one honest server provides differentially pri-
vate guarantees for the observed variables. In other words,
Vuvuzela adds noise (cover network traffic) to the two ob-
servables (by the adversary) viz. the number of dead drops
with one exchange request, and the number of dead drops
with two exchange requests, thereby providing communica-
tion privacy to clients. This privacy relaxation enables Vu-
2Even Tor, a practical anonymous communication system,
does not protect against such network level adversaries [32].
vuzela to scale to a large number of users – it can achieve
a throughput of 68,000 messages per second for a million
users. Systems such as Stadium [33], and Karaoke [25] fur-
ther improve upon Vuvuzela and scale to even larger sets of
users.
4.3 Limitations of Differentially Private Cryp-
tography
To end our discussions, we caution readers against careless
combinations of differential privacy and cryptographic prim-
itives. First, the limitations of both differential privacy as
well as cryptographic primitives apply to DP-cryptographic
primitives. For instance, an open question is deciding an
appropriate level for the privacy budget. Most applica-
tions that utilize DP to improve the performance of cryp-
tographic systems involve a trade-off between the level of
privacy achieved and the performance of the systems. More
generally, differentially private cryptographic systems open
up new trade-offs in a privacy-performance-utility space. For
instance, in the case of Shrinkwrap, weaker privacy guaran-
tee directly leads to lower performance overhead (privacy-
performance trade-off while keeping the accuracy level of the
query answer constant). On the other hand, systems such as
RAPPOR allow for approximate computation of statistics
and primarily provide a privacy-utility trade-off. Second,
designers need to carefully consider the suitability of these
hybrid techniques in their applications as these combina-
tions involve more complex trust assumptions and hence a
more complicated security analysis. We remind the reader
that while proposing newer differentially private systems for
cryptography, it is imperative to understand the meaning
of the privacy guarantees for the application in context. In
other words, differentially privacy for cryptography may not
be the right thing to do in all cases; however, it is well mo-
tivated when the goal is to build a differentially private sys-
tem. Finally, composition results, which bound the privacy
loss for a sequence of operations need to be independently
studied.
5. DISCUSSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this section, we provide directions for future work high-
lighting important and emerging open questions in the field.
We discuss open challenges in deploying differential privacy
in the real world – realistic datasets, alternative models and
trust assumptions, and other DP-cryptographic primitives.
Finally, we caution readers against callous combinations of
differential privacy and cryptography.
Differential Privacy Frameworks – SDP, LDP, and
Beyond: Over the past decade, there has been significant
progress in enabling applications in the standard differential
privacy model. For instance, there have been research ef-
forts in attuning differential privacy to handle realistic chal-
lenges such as multi-dimensional and complex data – involv-
ing graphs, time series, correlated data [26, 22]. Similarly,
there has been work in designing a tailored differential pri-
vacy mechanism that is optimized for particular application
setting to achieve good accuracy [29, 20]. Prior work has ex-
plored combinations of sequential and parallel composition,
dimensionality reduction, and sensitivity bound approxima-
tions to achieve good accuracy in the SDP model. However,
much work needs to be done in adapting state-of-the-art
techniques in SDP to more complex deployment scenarios
such as LDP. For instance, an open question is the follow-
ing:
Is there an algorithm that can efficiently search
the space of differentially private algorithms in
the LDP setting for the one that answers the in-
put query with the best accuracy?
Research advances have demonstrated such mechanisms for
the SDP model [29, 20], however, the discovery of such mech-
anisms in the LDP setting remains an open question. On a
similar note, it is unclear how nuanced variants of differen-
tial privacy that have been proposed to handle these more
complex databases [26, 22] in the SDP setting translate into
LDP or more complex deployment settings.
Differential Privacy in Practice – Trust Assump-
tions vs Accuracy Gap: We have seen how deployments
of differential privacy that differ in the trust assumptions
provide roughly the same privacy guarantee, but with vary-
ing levels of accuracy. In particular, we looked at a two pop-
ular deployment scenarios viz., SDP and LDP. There exist
other trust assumptions that we have not covered in this
article in detail. For instance, Google’s recently proposed
Prochlo system [8] uses trusted hardware assumptions to op-
timize utility of data analytics. On a similar note, Groce et.
al. [19] consider yet another model – where the users par-
ticipating are malicious. This is the first work to explore a
malicious adversarial model in the context of differential pri-
vacy and the development of better accuracy mechanisms for
such a model is an open research question. More concretely,
we can ask:
What other models of deployment of differential
privacy exist and how do we design mechanisms
for them? Can other technologies such as MPC,
FHE, trusted hardware open up new opportuni-
ties in mechanism design?
An interesting theoretical question is to characterize the sep-
aration between different trust models in terms of the best
accuracy achievable by a differential privacy algorithm un-
der that model. For instance, McGregor et. al. [28] provide
separation theorems i.e., gaps in achievable accuracy be-
tween (information-theoretic) differential privacy and com-
putational differential privacy for two-party protocols. In
reference to Section 3.2 we can ask the following concrete
question:
In the Mixnets model (Fig. 2B), what is the lower
bound on the errror for aggregate queries over re-
lational transformations (like joins and groupby)
over the data records? An example of such an
aggregate is the degree distribution of a graph
that reports the number of nodes with a certain
degree.
Relaxing Cryptographic Security via Differential
Privacy: The emerging paradigm of leaky yet differentially-
private cryptography leads to a number of open questions
for the research community. So far, the research commu-
nity has explored the intersection of differential privacy and
cryptographic primitives in limited contexts such as ORAM,
MPC, and anonymous communication. However, there ex-
ists a broader opportunity to explore the trade-offs of DP-
cryptographic primitives in contexts such as program ob-
fuscation, zero-knowledge proofs, encrypted databases, and
even traffic/protocol morphing. As described in Section 4,
we can ask:
What other cryptographic primitives can benefit
in performance from a privacy relaxation quan-
tified rigorously using differential privacy? How
can we design such relaxed primitives?
In the context of differentially-private data analysis, there
is a trade-off between privacy and utility. In the context of
differentially-private cryptographic primitives and resulting
applications, there is a broader trade-off space between pri-
vacy, utility, and performance. Another open question is the
following:
What lower bounds exist for overhead of crypto-
graphic primitives when the privacy guarantees
are relaxed using differential privacy?
Another challenge is how to design optimized protocols that
achieve desired trade-offs in the new design space of differentially-
private cryptography. The trade-off space between privacy,
utility, and performance is non-trivial, especially for com-
plex systems. An interesting research question is:
How to correctly model the trade-off space of
real systems so that system designers can decide
whether it is worth sacrificing some privacy or
utility for a better performance?
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